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Abstract
We argue that the reason why it has proved hard to determine whether negative effects on
economic performance and conflict are more strongly associated with polarized rather than
fractionalized societies is because the distinction between polarization and fractionalization
is only relevant for societies with ethnic diversity above a certain threshold. In addition
high levels of ethnic fractionalization at a country level are generally associated with
regional concentration of minorities, and as a result many regions may have a very different
ethnic composition from the national average, and in particular they may have much higher
levels of ethnic polarization than the national level. Because of the very different ethnic
composition of different regions in this situation, conflict is more likely to be confined to a
limited geographical area.
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21. Introduction
There is considerable evidence that greater ethnic diversity is associated with weaker
economic performance. Alesina et al. (2003), Easterly and Levine (1997) and Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol (2005b) find a negative effect of measures of ethnic diversity on
economic growth. Alesina et al. (1999) and Miguel and Gugerty (2005) show that local
supply of public goods is adversely affected when the population is ethnically
heterogeneous, Costalli, Moretti and Piscedda (2014) use a synthetic control method to
assess the national-level economic impact of civil war in a sample of 20 countries.
A common explanation for the negative effect of ethnic diversity on
economic performance is that more ethnically diverse societies suffer more serious internal
conflicts. Barro (1991) shows that revolutions and coups have a strong negative effect on
growth. The empirical association between ethnic diversity and armed conflict has been
quite extensively investigated. Bleaney and Dimico (2011) present evidence of a significant
correlation, although Hegre and Sambanis (2006) conclude that ethnic diversity is robustly
correlated only with the probability of small-scale conflict3. There is some evidence that
ethnic diversity makes conflicts harder to stop (Collier et al., 2004; Fearon, 2004), rather
than that it makes them more likely to start (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Collier et al.,
2009; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Kanbur et al. (2011) provide an in-depth survey of the
relationship between ethnic diversity and ethnic strife. Blattman and Miguel (2010) also
cover the topic extensively4.
A persistent – and so far unresolved – matter of debate has been whether it is ethnic
diversity per se or a particular pattern of diversity that is important. Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005a) argue that conflict is associated with polarization between two sizeable
ethnic groups rather than just the proliferation of groups as measured by a fractionalization
3 There are a few studies which focus on linguistic rather than ethnic diversity (i.e., Wimmer and Cederman,
2009) which find either a significant effect of linguistic diversity on conflict or a negative relationship
between linguistic polarization and conflict (Gardeazabal, 2011) .
4 There are also studies which look at the impact of conflict on ethnic diversity (i.e., Rohner, Thoenig, and
Zilibotti; 2013) and the impact of conflict linked to ethnicity on social conflict (i.e., Becchetti, Conzo, and
Romeo; 2014).
3index.5 Some recent research has suggested that conflicts are particularly hard to stop in
polarized societies (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2010; Schneider and Wiesehomeier,
2010).
In this paper we investigate two possible reasons why it has proved hard to
determine whether negative effects on economic performance are more strongly associated
with polarized rather than fractionalized societies.
One is that, for purely mathematical reasons, the distinction between polarization
and fractionalization is only relevant for societies with ethnic diversity above a certain
threshold. Below this threshold the two measures are very highly positively correlated, and
therefore statistically indistinguishable. If the major feature of the data is that ethnically
homogeneous societies are significantly more peaceful than those with even quite a limited
degree of heterogeneity, and beyond that the level of diversity makes little difference, then
statistical results will be similar whether diversity is measured by fractionalization or
polarization. The first hypothesis is therefore that ethnic diversity is largely uncorrelated
with conflict, except that near-homogeneous societies are more peaceful than others. In
other words the degree of ethnic diversity does not explain why one country with
significant ethnic diversity is more prone to armed conflict than another country with
significant ethnic diversity, but only why such countries are more conflict-prone than
ethnically homogeneous countries.
The second hypothesis assumes that polarization is the critical aspect of ethnic
diversity, but not necessarily just at the national level. In highly fractionalized societies,
the national measure of polarization tends to be rather low, because of the limited
population share of even the largest groups. However, if high levels of ethnic
fractionalization are associated with regional concentration of minorities, as we show below
to be typically the case, then many regions may have a very different ethnic composition
from the national average, and in particular they may have much higher levels of ethnic
5 A country is said to be polarized if the second largest group makes up a substantial share of the population
and is not much smaller than the largest group.
4polarization than the national level.6 On the other hand, because of the very different ethnic
composition of different regions, in this situation conflict is more likely to be confined to a
limited geographical area. Although we do not have data on regional ethnic diversity, it is
possible to test whether the geographical extent of conflict decreases at high levels of
fractionalization, and whether minority groups are more likely to be engaged in rebellious
activity when they are regionally concentrated.
Previous work that is quite closely related to this second hypothesis includes Toft
(2003), Fearon and Laitin (2011) and Esteban and Ray (2011). As Toft notes, bargaining
theory tells us that armed conflict is not usually the rational solution to disagreements,
because it is so costly to both sides, but may occur under certain conditions, of which the
relevant one in this case is the indivisibility of the prize. Toft argues that, where minorities
are regionally concentrated rather than dispersed, they are much more likely to regard their
territory as indivisible, which tends to create conflict with other groups in the locality. This
theory suggests that regional concentration of minorities should be positively correlated
with the probability of armed conflict. It say nothing about the overall intra-regional
population distribution, and tends to suggest that fractionalization is more important than
polarization, because higher fractionalization implies more minorities.
Fearon and Laitin (2011) argue that nearly a third of ethnic civil wars arise from
migration, mainly by members of the dominant ethnic group, into areas historically
inhabited by a minority group. They discuss a number of examples, mainly from Asia.
This idea seems quite closely related to ours in that local polarization appears to be an
important factor, but it is more restrictive in that they stress the element of migration.
Esteban and Ray (2011) hypothesize that either fractionalization or polarization can
be relevant, depending on circumstances. They develop a theoretical model in which the
relationship between the investment of resources in conflict and ethnic diversity depends on
the nature of the prize for winning the conflict, and show that, in this model, ethnic
6 Alternatively they may not, because some regions might be almost entirely inhabited by one ethnic group,
but this case is most likely to occur when there is only one large minority (so that fractionalization is limited).
5polarization stimulates conflict if the prize is a public good, whereas ethnic
fractionalization (splintering into many groups) stimulates conflict if the prize is a private
good.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The probability of winning increases with
a group’s population and its per capita investment. If the prize is a private good, the losers
can be completely excluded and the winners take the entire prize. The per capita gain from
winning is therefore inversely related to the winning group’s size, so small groups are
tempted to invest a lot in the conflict, even though their winning probability for a given per
capita investment is low. In this case, ethnic fractionalization stimulates investment in
conflict. If, on the other hand, the prize is a public good, which will be enjoyed also by the
losers, the gain from winning consists, not in the quantity of the good obtained, but only in
being able to choose one’s preferred form of the public good. The per capita gain from
winning is therefore independent of group size, and it only pays groups that can
significantly improve their probability of winning at the margin to invest in conflict. This
incentive is greatest for two roughly equally size groups (i.e. when polarization is high).
Esteban et al. (2012) offer some supportive empirical evidence for this model.
This model suggests that either polarization or fractionalization may be associated
with conflict, depending on circumstances. The purpose of the present paper is to offer a
different reason why both polarization and fractionalization (measured at the national level)
matter for conflict. As we show, ethnic groups are typically quite regionally concentrated.
This is not surprising, since linguistic and cultural differences emerged historically mainly
through geographical isolation. The implication of this is that the ethnic composition of
regions of a country tends to differ quite markedly from the national average, and from
each other. Conflict may therefore be quite localized, as is shown by geographically
disaggregated data sets (i.e., Tollefsen et al., 2012). For example in Turkey conflict is
mainly confined to areas with a substantial Kurdish-speaking population.
The hypothesis that we put forward here is that armed conflict is more common in
polarized communities, whether they be polarized at the national level or at the local level.
6Ethnic fractionalization is not intrinsically associated with conflict, but if ethnic groups are
regionally concentrated (as they tend to be), fractionalized countries will tend to have
pockets of local polarization. If the second largest group is a relatively small proportion of
the national population, but a large proportion of the population of a region, the national
measure of polarization will be relatively low, but the local measure of polarization in that
region will be quite high, as will be the national measure of ethnic fractionalization (the
standard measure of ethnic diversity, equal to one minus the Herfindahl index of
concentration). This hypothesis would explain why ethnic fractionalization and
polarization perform about equally well in predicting the presence of conflict in a country
(i.e., in the model of Bleaney and Dimico, 2011): fractionalization picks up conflict
associated with local (but not national) polarization, whilst both measures are low in
ethnically homogeneous countries.
To test this hypothesis we use group-level data from the MAR dataset in order to
have a direct test of the relationship between ethnic polarization at a subnational level
(measured by the regional concentration of the group) and the probability of armed conflict,
and also its geographical extent. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that local
concentration of groups increases with the level of national fractionalization, and because
of that national fractionalization increases the probability of local pockets of polarization.
Therefore countries with a higher level of national fractionalization tend to experience
conflicts of smaller scale compared to ethnically polarized countries, which explains why
ethnic fractionalization is more strongly correlated with conflict in datasets with a low
death threshold (i.e. the UCDP/PRIO with a 25 battle-related death threshold) than in those
with a relatively high death threshold (i.e. the Correlates of War with a 1,000 death
threshold). Our explanation of such an effect relates to the probability that ethnic
fractionalized countries are characterized by pockets of local polarization, which then tend
to increase the probability of local and less extensive conflicts. This explanation is
confirmed by the group-level analysis where we show a significant relationship between the
national level of fractionalization and the probability of regional concentration of groups
(and therefore the level of subnational polarization) which then has a negative effect on the
7geographical extent of the conflict. These results are also consistent with evidence from
Indonesia by Barron et al. (2009) who show a positive relation between local conflicts and
ethnic clustering.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section Two we test the first hypothesis: that
the correlation between conflict and measures of ethnic diversity is most evident towards
the homogeneous end of the spectrum. In Section Three we show theoretically that ethnic
fractionalization plus regional concentration of groups gives rise to pockets of local
polarization. Section Four provides evidence that minority groups are indeed regionally
concentrated. Section Five explores data from the Minorities at Risk Project on the regional
concentration of minorities and their participation in rebellious activities. Regional
concentration is associated with greater incidence of conflict, but less geographical extent.
These results are consistent with our hypothesis that local polarization makes a country
susceptible to local conflicts. Section Six concludes.
2. Conflict and Ethnic Diversity
The most commonly used measure of ethnic diversity is ethnic fractionalization, which is
equal to one minus a Herfindahl index of concentration:
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where i represents the population share of group i and n is the total number of groups.
This measure has a minimum of zero, when there is just one group, and a maximum of one.
In practice it is strongly negatively correlated with the share of the largest group.
Figure 1: Ethnic Fractionalization vs Ethnic Polarization
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Esteban and Ray (1994) argue that conflict is most likely when the largest group is
faced by a substantial minority group. Based on this, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a)
use the following index of ethnic polarization, which is a particular case of the class of
indices proposed by Esteban and Ray (1994):
2 2
1 1
1 4 (0.5 ) 4 (1 )
n n
i i i i
i i
P    
 
      (2)
Polarization reaches a maximum of one when there are just two equally sized groups, and is
in practice strongly positively correlated with the share of the second largest group. As
shown in Figure 1, polarization diminishes at high levels of fractionalization, and also as
the share of the dominant group becomes very large. Polarization and fractionalization are
strongly positively correlated when the two largest groups form a large share of the
population, but tend to be negatively correlated if the share of the two largest groups is
relatively low.7F
Table 1. Conflict and Ethnic Diversity (Country-Year Data over the perido 1945-2004)
7 If there are only two groups, P is precisely equal to twice F. If there are n groups of equal size, then as n
tends to infinity, F tends to one but P tends to zero. In our sample the share of the two largest groups averages
81%. For cases where the share exceeds 81%, the correlation between F and P is 0.61, but for cases where the
share is less than 81%, the correlation is only 0.09.
9Dependent Variable: Incidence of Conflict (UCDP/PRIO)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Full Sample If Ethnic Frac >0.5 If Ethnic Frac < 0.5
GDP p.c. (t-1) -0.100*** -0.142*** -0.140*** -0.141*** -0.107*** -0.101***
(-4.13) (-6.01) (-3.62) (-3.73) (-3.41) (-3.17)
Population (t-1) 0.0715*** 0.0896*** 0.0600** 0.0504 0.113*** 0.119***
(3.24) (3.97) (2.01) (1.63) (3.24) (3.34)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.626*** 0.389 1.725***
(5.58) (1.17) (5.22)
Ethnic Polarization 0.726*** -0.479 1.166***
(5.90) (-1.61) (5.49)
Mountainous Terrain 0.241* 0.0575 0.127 0.155 0.174 0.0743
(1.89) (0.45) (0.79) (0.94) (0.79) (0.33)
Onshore Oil Fields 0.124** 0.0477 0.187** 0.210** -0.0327 -0.0656
(1.96) (0.75) (2.22) (2.44) (-0.30) (-0.59)
Anocracy (t-1) 0.108 0.124* 0.0242 0.0235 0.189 0.170
(1.44) (1.68) (0.26) (0.25) (1.45) (1.29)
Post-Cold War Dummy -0.150 -0.130 -0.226 -0.236 -0.00811 -0.0621
(-0.84) (-0.73) (-0.96) (-1.01) (-0.03) (-0.23)
Time Trend 0.0115*** 0.0115*** 0.0171*** 0.0172*** 0.00680 0.00714
(3.87) (3.91) (4.05) (4.07) (1.55) (1.62)
Time Trend*Cold War Dummy -0.00978** -0.00925** -0.0134** -0.0135** -0.00516 -0.00647
(-2.16) (-2.08) (-2.19) (-2.20) (-0.75) (-0.96)
Incidence (t-1) 2.028*** 2.024*** 1.963*** 1.961*** 2.085*** 2.076***
(25.73) (25.72) (19.86) (19.82) (15.97) (15.83)
Incidence (t-2) 0.969*** 0.971*** 0.955*** 0.950*** 0.942*** 0.939***
(12.10) (12.11) (9.56) (9.51) (7.13) (7.07)
Constant -2.324*** -2.222*** -1.796*** -1.105** -2.870*** -2.979***
(-6.81) (-6.64) (-3.38) (-2.37) (-5.86) (-5.87)
Observations 6,756 6,756 3,310 3,310 3,446 3,446
Estimation method: probit. Robust z-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The dependent is a binary variable coded 1 if for any country-year there is conflict and 0 if in such a country-year
there is not conflict. Source of data: UCDP/PRIO
Table 1 shows the results of estimating a probit model for the incidence of conflict, based
on the specification of Bleaney and Dimico (2011). Models 1 and 2 are identical except
that Model 2 includes ethnic polarization in place of ethnic fractionalization. Both
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measures have highly significant positive coefficients in the full sample. Then we divide
the sample according to whether ethnic fractionalization is greater than 0.5 (Models 3 and
4) or less than 0.5 (Models 5 and 6). At higher levels of ethnic diversity (Models 3 and 4),
neither fractionalization nor polarization is statistically significant, but at lower levels
(Models 5 and 6), they are almost as statistically significant as in the full sample. These
results dramatically confirm our first hypothesis, that polarization and fractionalization
perform similarly in these empirical tests because the correlation is strongest at low levels
of ethnic diversity where the two measures are highly positively correlated. In the
remainder of the paper, we investigate the apparent statistical insignificance of ethnic
variables at higher levels of diversity.
3. Ethnic Fractionalization and Polarization
The available data sets refer only to polarization (or fractionalization) at the national
level. The relationship between this number and local polarization can be complex.
Polarization at the local level will depend not just on the national population shares of each
ethnic group but also on how geographically concentrated they are. If two large groups are
geographically separated, it is possible that polarization could be low at the local level but
high at the national level. On the other hand, if ethnic fractionalization (F) is high, in
which case polarization (P) is necessarily quite low, there could be quite strongly polarized
regions of the country. This is particularly the case as ethnic minorities are often
geographically concentrated. For example, suppose that there are ten groups each
representing exactly 10% of the population. Then F = 0.90 and P = 0.36, which is not very
high. If, however, these groups are unequally distributed across the country, so that in each
region there are only five groups each representing 20% of the population, then local
polarization is 0.64 in every region, which implies that the average local polarization is
considerably greater than the national polarization figure.
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Thus the combination of high ethnic fractionalization and an uneven regional
distribution of ethnic groups is likely to result in relatively high polarization levels in at
least some regions. If polarization at the local as well as the national level increases the
incidence of conflict, then high ethnic fractionalization will also tend to be associated with
an increased incidence of local conflicts. We test this hypothesis using data on the
proportion of the country affected by conflict in any given year.
To investigate the relationship between average local polarization and ethnic
fractionalization more formally, consider cases where at least one ethnic group is not
represented in any given region. We analyse two possibilities: (1) where the regional
population shares are formed from the national population shares by adding the missing
group’s shares entirely to that of one other group; and (2) where the share of the missing
group is redistributed equally amongst all the represented groups.
In the first case, as shown in the Appendix, the merging of any two groups with shares
i and j will change polarization by
4 [2 3( )]i j i jP        (3)
which is positive if the two groups’ shares sum to less than two-thirds, but negative if they
sum to more than two-thirds. Once the number of groups exceeds three, and if the two
largest groups make up less than two-thirds of the population, then all regions will have
greater polarization than the national measure. Thus in this case it is highly likely that
average local polarization exceeds national polarization when ethnic fractionalization is
high.
Table 2. National and Local Polarization
Number of
equal-sized
National
fractionalization
National
polarization
Regional polarization index
(equal in every region)
12
groups index index
Each group
absent from 1
Each group
absent from 23 0.67 0.89 1 0
4 0.75 0.75 0.89 1
5 0.80 0.64 0.75 0.89
6 0.83 0.56 0.64 0.75
7 0.86 0.49 0.56 0.64
8 0.89 0.44 0.49 0.56
Note. It is assumed that a group is evenly distributed across regions where it is represented
Table 2 shows some numerical examples where there are n regions and n equally sized
groups within the national population, but the groups are regionally concentrated to the
extent of each being absent from either one or two regions. It is assumed that the groups
that are present within a region are equally represented within the regional population. To
take an example, when n = 5 and there are two groups absent from each region, the three
groups that are present each make up one-third of the regional population. The table shows
that as long as n ≥ 4, so that ethnic fractionalization is relatively high, regional polarization 
exceeds national polarization.
In the second case, it is shown in the Appendix that elimination of group j and
redistribution of its share equally amongst the n remaining groups results in a change of
polarization of:
2 2 2 24 [3 1 (1 3 ) (1 3 2 )]P am F a m m a m m m         (4)
where m = n-1, a = nj and F is the index of ethnic fractionalization defined in equation (1).
The parameter a reflects the relative size of the excluded group j (which is equal to the
average of the others when a = n/(n+1)). Equation (4) is more likely to be positive when F
is high, but it is also negatively related to the size of the eliminated group (a). For a=1,
equation (5) reduces to
2 34 (3 2 2 )P m F m    (5)
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This is always satisfied if F > ⅔, which is likely if n ≥ 3 and the largest group’s share is less 
than 50%. Thus, when regional shares are constructed by setting one group’s share to zero
and adding the remainder equally to all the other groups’ national shares, average local
polarization will exceed national polarization when F is high.
On the other hand, if there are only two groups (so F ≤ 0.50), deviations of regional 
population shares from the national population shares imply that the population-weighted
average of regional polarization is below the national figure, although regional polarization
will be greater than the national figure in some regions.8
In the absence of regional data on ethnic composition, we capture this effect by using
ethnic fractionalization as a proxy for the difference between average regional polarization
(LP) and national polarization (NP). As Table 2 suggests, this deviation tends to be
negative when F is low and positive when F is high.
We hypothesize that the incidence of conflict is increasing in NP and in LP, but that the
proportion of the country affected is decreasing in LP, for given NP, because if NP is low,
some regions may be very unpolarized, or have ethnic composition very different from
those where there is conflict, and so remain unaffected. Thus we expect the extent of
conflict to be negatively related to the degree of ethnic fractionalization.
4. Regional Concentration of Minority Groups
The MAR Project was initiated by Ted Gurr and is based at the University of
Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM). It
“tracks politically-active ethnic groups throughout the world from 1945 to the present.
identifying where they are, what they do, and what happens to them. MAR focuses
8 For example, if there are two equally sized regions, then average regional polarization is smaller
than national polarization by 2x2, where x is the deviation of a group’s regional population share from its
national average. This is the result of the non-linearity of the polarization index, which becomes more
sensitive to variations in the size of the largest group as that size deviates from 0.5.
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specifically on ethnopolitical groups, non-state communal groups that have "political
significance" in the contemporary world because of their status and political actions.
Political significance is determined by the following two criteria:
 The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment
vis-a-vis other groups in a society
 The group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense or
promotion of its self-defined interests” (MAR Codebook, pg 1)
This source provides information on geographical concentration of minority groups (by
administrative region), and also for 1985 onwards the extent to which each group was
involved in rebellious activity. The MAR data define minorities as either (1) widely
geographically dispersed, (2) unevenly distributed with less than 50% in any one
administrative region, (3) concentrated with between 50% and 75% in one region, or (4)
highly concentrated with more than 75% in one region. Table 3 uses MAR data to show
that in 83 cases out of 113, the second largest population group is at least 50% concentrated
in one administrative region (and in 45 cases the population is more than 75% concentrated
in one region).9 These figures are not distorted by cases where the population of the second
largest group is small – in fact concentration is more likely when the population share is
larger, as is shown by the figures for mean population share. For example the mean shares
of the second group are 0.2 and 0.19 respectively for the 83 countries in which either the
majority of the population or the total share of the population of groups is concentrated in
one region, but below 0.19 and 0.13 if the population is defined as widely dispersed or
primarily urban but otherwise dispersed. A similar pattern is evident in the case of the third
and fourth largest groups. Out of all the minorities in the data set, 74.7% have at least 50%
of their population concentrated in one administrative region of the country.
Table 3: Minority Groups’ Population Share by Regional Concentration in 2000
9 Table 3 uses the variable coded “GROUPCON” in the MARGen data set.
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Population Shares for Second Largest Group Given the Level of Concentration in 2000
Spatial Distribution of This Group Freq. Mean Share
Widely Dispersed 11 0.197
Primarily Urban otherwise Dispersed 19 0.126
Majority Concentrated in One Region 29 0.200
>75% Concentrated in One Region 54 0.192
113 0.183
Population Shares for Third Largest Group Given the Level of Concentration in 2000
Freq. Mean Share
Widely Dispersed 9 0.037
Primarily Urban otherwise Dispersed 17 0.066
Majority Concentrated in One Region 27 0.082
>75% Concentrated in One Region 50 0.095
Total 103 0.082
Population Shares for Fourth Largest Group Given the Level of Concentration in 2000
Freq. Mean Share .
Widely Dispersed 6 0.030
Primarily Urban otherwise Dispersed 14 0.037
Majority Concentrated in One Region 18 0.042
>75% Concentrated in One Region 44 0.064
Total 82 0.052
In Tables 4 and 5, as an example, we show the level of regional concentration of
groups for four highly fractionalized countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Angola, and Ethiopia), and
for four highly polarized countries (Burundi, Rwanda, Latvia, and Estonia) respectively.
Table 4 shows that groups in highly fractionalized countries are likely to be concentrated in
one region. On the other hand, Table 5 shows that groups in highly polarized countries tend
to be highly dispersed.
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Table 4: Concentration of Minority Groups for Selected Fractionalized Countries (1985-
2005)
Country Fractionaliz. Polariz. GroupName Group Sh. Spatial Distribution Share in Reg.
Ghana 0.846 0.50 Mossi-Dag. 0.160 Concentrated in Region >75%
Ewe 0.130 Concentrated in Region >75%
Ashanti 0.280 Concentrated in Region >75%
Nigeria 0.8 0.61 Yoruba 0.200 Concentrated in Region >75%
Ibo 0.170 Majority in one Region 50-75%
Ijaw 0.040 Concentrated in Region >75%
Hausa 0.290 Concentrated in Region >75%
Ogani 0.005 Concentrated in Region >75%
Ethiopia 0.76 0.63 Amhara 0.264 Majority in one Region 50-75%
Tigreans 0.097 Concentrated in Region >75%
Eritreans 0.75 Concentrated in Region >75%
Nilo-
Saharan 0.016 Concentrated in Region >75%
Somalis 0.057 Concentrated in Region >75%
Afars 0.043 Concentrated in Region >75%
Oromo 0.400 Majority in one Region 50-75%
Angola 0.76 0.70 Mbundu 0.357 Concentrated in Region >75%
Bakongo 0.133 Concentrated in Region >75%
Cabinda 0.017 Concentrated in Region >75%
Table 5: Concentration of Minority Groups for Selected Polarized Countries (1985-2005)
Country Fractionaliz. Polariz. Group
Name
Groups’
Sh.
Spatial Distribution Share in
Region
Rwanda 0.18 0.36 Tutsis 0.163 Widely dispersed No region
Burundi 0.33 0.64 Tutsis 0.153 Widely dispersed No region
Latvia 0.58 0.86 Russians 0.341 Widely Dispersed No region
Estonia 0.51 0.85 Russians 0.294 Primarily Urban (disp.) <50%
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Table 6: Regional Concentration of Groups and Ethnic Fractionalization in 2000
(Cross Minority Group Data)
Dependent Variable: Concentration of Minority Groups
Estimation Method: OLS Model 1
Ethnic Fractionalization (EF) 1.100***
(2.64)
Ethnic Polarization -0.124
(-0.35)
Share of the Largest Group -1.304***
(-2.99)
Share of the Second Largest Group -1.418*
(-1.89)
Western Countries -0.535 -0.684** -0.571*
(-1.62) (-2.13) (-1.67)
East Europe -0.215 -0.313 -0.222
(-0.85) (-1.23) (-0.84)
Latin America 0.222 0.257 0.329
(0.83) (0.95) (1.21)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0751 0.371 0.0400
(0.29) (1.61) (0.15)
Asia -0.105 -0.102 -0.162
(-0.41) (-0.40) (-0.61)
Constant 1.566*** 2.173*** 3.167***
(5.44) (7.54) (8.14)
Observations 275 275 275
R-squared 0.119 0.089 0.122
The dependent variable is coded GROUPCON in the MARGen data set. It takes the value 0, 1, 2 or 3, with 3
representing the highest level of concentration. Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
In Table 6 we provide evidence of the relationship between national ethnic diversity and
regional concentration of minorities. In Model 1 the dependent variable is the degree of
regional concentration of the group as specified above. The regressors are the national
ethnic fractionalization index and dummies for different regions of the world. Only ethnic
fractionalization is statistically significant (at the 1% level), and its coefficient is positive.
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In Model 2 we replace ethnic fractionalization with ethnic polarization and the coefficient
is insignificant. In Model 3 we finally replace indices of fractionalization and polarization
with population shares of the largest and second largest groups. Regional concentration of
minorities is higher when the shares of the two largest groups are smaller. These results
imply that, when ethnic fractionalization is relatively high, local polarization may be
considerable even if the national polarization index is relatively low.
5. Regional Concentration and Extent of Conflict
In this Section we turn to the relationship between regional concentration of minority
groups and extent of conflicts. Table 7 provides data on the scale of the rebellion by each
minority group in a given year, from the same source. There are only 1258 episodes in
which a group is involved in a rebellion. Out of these 1258 episodes, there are 579
observations in which the rebellion is quite local (political banditry, campaign of terrorism,
and local rebellion). In 170 episodes there has been civil war, and in 112 episodes there has
been large-scale guerrilla activity. Finally there are also 395 episodes in which the scale of
the guerrilla activity is either intermediate or small.10 The data fit particularly well with our
analysis given that these categories are also coded taking into consideration the
geographical extent of the conflict. For example a local rebellion is defined as an armed
attempt to seize power in a locale. Small-scale guerrilla activity is coded if there are 1)
fewer than 1000 armed fighters; 2) sporadic armed attacks (less than six reported per year);
or 3) attacks in a small part of the area occupied by the group, or in one or two other
locales. On the other hand large-scale guerrilla activity is coded if there are 1) more than
1000 armed fighters; 2) frequent armed attacks (more than six per year); or 3) attacks
affecting a large part of the area occupied by the group. A civil war affects the entire
country.
10 The relevant variable in the MARGen data set is coded “REB”.
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Table 7: Severity of Rebellion by Minority Groups
Rebellion Freq. Percent Cum.
None reported 3,743 74.85 74.85
Political banditry, sporadic terrorism 307 6.14 80.98
Campaigns of terrorism (more than 6 events) 138 2.76 83.74
Local rebellions 134 2.68 86.42
Small-scale guerrilla activity 220 4.40 90.82
Intermediate guerrilla activity 175 3.50 94.32
Large-scale guerrilla activity 112 2.24 96.56
Civil war 163 3.26 99.82
Protacted Civil War 9 0.18 100.00
In order to test whether greater regional concentration of minority groups is associated with
a higher probability of conflict and whether these conflicts are more likely to be of limited
extent, we estimate a two-stage Heckman model where at the selection stage (Panel B) the
dependent variable is a minority group’s involvement in rebellion, and at the outcome stage
(Panel A) the dependent variable is a measure of the scale of the rebellion (1 = political
banditry up to local rebellions; 2 = guerrilla activity of any scale; 3 = civil war). As a
measure of local distribution of the group we rescale the variable for the regional
concentration of groups from the MARGen dataset on a 0-1 basis. As a result the variable is
zero if the group is geographically dispersed and 1 if at least a minority of less than 50% of
the population is concentrated in one region11. We also enter a full set of explanatory
variables which includes national population (in logs), national GDP per capita (in log),
dummies for anocracy, new independent states, and political instability which Sambanis
(2004) finds to be significant predictors of conflict; controls for oil dependency from
Fearon and Laitin (2003), alluvial diamond mines as in Lujala et al. (2005), and the relevant
minority group’s population share from the MAR project. Year dummies are also used to
capture changes in the probability of conflict over time (i.e. after the cold war)12. The
Heckman procedure controls for the sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979) related to the
11 We also try different coding rules are results are largely confirmed.
12 Table A1 in the Appendix 2 reports descriptive statistics.
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extent of conflict, given that the latter is only observed for countries/groups which
experience a conflict. By controlling for the correlation between unobservables in the
selection equation (probability of conflict) with unobservables in the outcome equation
(extent of conflict) the Heckman estimator controls for such a sample selection bias.
Indeed, suppose that a conflict tends to have a smaller extent in countries which are more
prone to conflict (i.e. countries which have experienced conflicts for longer periods like
Sri-Lanka and Ethiopia) and that this is in some way correlated with the distribution of
groups. Then if we do not control for this correlation between probability and extent of
conflict there is a risk of over-estimating the extent of conflict. Practically, the distribution
of groups will capture the correlation between distribution of groups and conflict rather
than the correlation between distribution of groups and extent of conflict.
Results are shown in Table 8 for three alternative exclusion restrictions (variables
that appear in the selection equation only): (a) a measure of the average level of
precipitation (Model 1) which according to Miguel et al. (2004) affects conflict only
through GDP growth and more specifically through commodity shocks (Ciccone, 2011), (b)
a measure of the share of population in the tropical area (Model 2) from Sachs (2003) given
that environment disease factors affect institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2002) and therefore the
probability of conflict through state capability (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), (c) a dummy for
pre-colonial origin (Model 3) which records whether the group has been living in the
current region (area) since the eighteenth century (before colonization)13. Even though
variables above represent plausible exclusion restrictions the potential non-excludability of
these variables should bias results towards zero, given the negative correlation between the
probability and the extent of conflict. Therefore in the worst case scenario there may be a
downward bias (biased toward zero) of the variable of interest.
In Table 8 the inverse Mills ratio is significant for two out of three models and as
argued above the negative coefficient captures the negative relationship between extent and
probability of conflict. In Model 1 the variable for the regional concentration of groups is
significant at the 1% level with positive coefficients in the selection equation, indicating
13 This variable is coded as “TRADITN” in the MARGen data set.
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that even with a moderate degree of regional concentration rebellion is more frequent. In
the outcome equation for Model 1, the concentration dummy has a significant negative
coefficient, indicating that with greater concentration rebellions are more localized. In
Model 2 we replace precipitation with the share of the population in tropical area as an
exclusion restriction and results are quite similar. The concentration dummy increases the
probability of conflict but has a negative effect on the extent of rebellion though the effect
is not significant due to the fact that the mills ratio is also not significant causing problems
of sample selection bias. Finally in Model 3 we use the pre-colonial origins of the group as
an exclusion restriction and results still hold with the dummy for regional concentration
having a significant positive effect on the probability of conflict and a negative effect on
the severity of rebellion.
The message of these results is, therefore, that more regionally concentrated
minorities tend to engage in rebellions, and also that these rebellions are likely to be
localized. This is consistent with our hypothesis about the importance of local polarization,
which is likely to come about in ethnically fractionalized countries when groups are
regionally concentrated. These results are also consistent with Toft’s (2003) analysis of the
impact of settlement patterns (i.e., regional concentration of groups) on the probability of
ethnic violence when she argues that regional concentration of groups is likely to increase
the probability of ethnic violence because of the higher capability related to the ability to
mobilize fighters. She does not fully explore the impact of the distribution of groups on the
extent of conflict. However her idea that groups concentrated in a historical homeland are
more likely to be involved in conflict because of demands for independence seems
consistent with our analysis related to the extent of conflict.
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Table 8 – Severity of Rebellion by Minority Groups – 2-Step Heckman Estimator
(Minority Group Year Data over the period 1985-2005)
Estimation Method: Heckman
Estimator
Panel A: Severity of the
Rebellion Panel B: Incidence of Rebellion
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Group Share of National Population -3.232*** -1.193 0.266 0.777*** 0.800*** -0.0767
(-4.12) (-1.49) (0.93) (4.24) (4.35) (-0.44)
Regional Concentration of Groups -3.032*** -0.930 -0.821*** 0.797*** 0.781*** 0.947***
(-4.00) (-1.20) (-2.75) (10.59) (10.02) (12.83)
GDP per Capita (lagged) 0.694** -0.144 -0.272*** -0.324*** -0.299*** -0.306***
(2.45) (-0.49) (-3.38) (-13.85) (-11.06) (-13.34)
National Population (lagged) -0.542*** -0.144 0.0187 0.155*** 0.164*** 0.0471***
(-3.89) (-0.94) (0.54) (9.40) (9.20) (3.01)
Oil Dependency 2.116*** 1.065** 0.414*** -0.462*** -0.438*** -0.199***
(5.15) (2.37) (3.82) (-7.28) (-6.99) (-3.86)
Anocracy (Lagged) 0.542*** 0.285* 0.276** -0.102* -0.0907 -0.180***
(3.50) (1.84) (2.12) (-1.85) (-1.62) (-3.52)
New Independent State 4.204*** 2.436*** 2.284*** -0.593*** -0.483** -0.618***
(5.26) (3.25) (4.68) (-3.04) (-2.44) (-3.32)
Political Instability -0.220 -0.167 0.0242 0.0533 0.110* 0.00251
(-1.64) (-1.03) (0.19) (0.86) (1.74) (0.04)
Diamond Mines 0.420** -0.0487 -0.0430 -0.155*** -0.234*** -0.249***
(2.46) (-0.21) (-0.38) (-2.78) (-3.80) (-4.29)
Mountaious Terrain -0.112** 0.0660 0.0702* 0.0508*** 0.0375* -0.0144
(-1.99) (1.36) (1.80) (2.67) (1.90) (-0.83)
Precipitation -0.00004
(-1.38)
Tropical Area 0.0537
(0.88)
Pre-Colonial Origins 0.770***
(11.23)
Inverse Mills Ratio -6.111*** -2.396 -1.768***
(-4.45) (-1.64) (-4.53)
Cut-Off 1 -9.135*** -5.721*** -4.007***
(-6.57) (-3.85) (-6.73)
Cut-Off 2 -7.714*** -4.409*** -2.514***
(-5.57) (-2.99) (-4.31)
Constant -0.0381 -0.351 0.620**
(-0.13) (-1.00) (2.24)
Observations 949 866 901 3,719 3,509 4,391
The dependent variable in Panel A is the severity of the rebellion recoded as 1 = political banditry up to local
rebellions; 2 = guerrilla activity of any scale; 3 = civil war (see page 15). The dependent variable in Panel B
is a dichotomous variable for whether such a group-year is involved in a conflict. Source: MARGen data set.
Robust z-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9– Marginal Effects
Marginal Effects
Local Rebellion Guerrilla Civil War
Regional Concentration of Groups 0.275*** -0.065*** -0.210**
(4.00) (-2.80) (-2.38)
In Table 9 we show marginal effects for the concentration variable in Model 3 above. For
groups which are regionally concentrated the probability of a local rebellion increases by
almost 27.5 percent. However the probability of guerrilla and civil war for groups that are
regionally concentrated decreases by almost 6.5 percent and 21 percent respectively.
Therefore the regional concentration of groups (which we use as a proxy of local
polarization) on the one hand increases the probability of localized conflicts (local
rebellion) and on the other hand decreases the probability of more widespread conflicts (i.e.
guerrilla or civil war) which seems to be in line with our predictions
6. Conclusions
The relationship between ethnic diversity and conflict is still a matter of debate. In this
paper we have first of all shown that this is because the relationship is far stronger at
relatively low levels of diversity, where the two measures are so highly correlated as to be
virtually indistinguishable. Then we have offered an explanation for the weakness of the
relationship at higher levels of diversity.
Our central point is that minorities tend not to be evenly distributed across the
country, so there can be a big difference between regional and national measures of
diversity. Our theory is that what matters is polarization, either at the national or the local
level. Because the regional distribution of ethnic groups within a country can be very
uneven, an ethnically fractionalized country may be quite polarized in some localities, even
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if its national polarization measure is not particularly high. Because of this, it may be
difficult to pick up a relationship between conflict and national polarization measures at the
more ethnically diverse end of the spectrum. The data strongly support this hypothesis:
there is a strong correlation between the probability of conflict and either measure of ethnic
diversity up to a measure of fractionalization of 0.5, but none at all above that level.
Using information on the geographical concentration of minorities and their
involvement in rebellious activity from the data set of the Minorities at Risk Project we find
(a) that in ethnically fractionalized countries minority groups are more likely to be
regionally concentrated, implying pockets of local polarization; and (b) that minorities
whose populations are geographically concentrated are more likely to be involved in
rebellious activity, although this activity is also more likely to be small-scale and local.
This evidence on minority groups’ involvement in rebellion is consistent with the
hypothesis that polarization at the local level makes local conflict more likely. The
association between high ethnic fractionalization and significant polarization at the regional
level explains why conflict is more likely in these cases than would be predicted on the
basis of a relatively low level of national polarization.
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Appendix 1
To investigate the relationship between average local polarization and ethnic
fractionalization in the presence of regional concentration of groups more formally,
consider cases where at least one ethnic group is not represented in any given region. We
analyse two possibilities: (1) where the regional population shares are formed from the
national population shares by adding the missing group’s share entirely to that of one other
group (which is equivalent to the merging of two groups); and (2) where the share of the
missing group is redistributed equally amongst all the represented groups.
(1) Merging of two groups
If groups i and j merge, then from equation (2) the change in the polarization index is:
2 2 24[( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )]i j i j i i j jP                 i i i i=4π π [2-3(π +π )] (A1)
This expression is positive if the two groups’ shares sum to less than two-thirds, but
negative if they sum to more than two-thirds. Thus regional concentration of groups tends
to increase local polarization up to the point where the merged group reaches a two-thirds
majority locally. In particular, once the number of groups exceeds three, and if the two
largest groups make up less than two-thirds of the population, then all regions will have
greater polarization than the national measure. Note that this case of more than three
groups with the two largest groups’ shares representing less than two-thirds implies a high
degree of ethnic fractionalization.
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(2) Elimination of one group with its share equally divided between the remaining
groups
In the second case (the elimination of group j and redistribution of its share equally
amongst the n remaining groups), the algebra is more involved. Let the eliminated group be
group 1, and let there be n other groups.
Writing m = 1/n, then
1
2 2 2
1 1 1 1
2
4 [( ) (1 ) (1 )] 4 (1 )
n
i i i i
i
P m m       


         (A2)
Expanding this gives
1
2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2
4 (2 3 3 ) 4 (1 )
n
i i i
i
P m m m m m         


        (A3)
Substituting
1 1 1
2 2
1 1
2 2 2
1 1/ , 1 , 1
n n n
i i
i i i
m F   
  
  
        ,
we obtain
2 2 2 3
1 1 14 (3 1) 4(1 3 ) 4(1 3 2 )P m F m m m m           (A4)
Substituting am1 yields the following expression:
2 2 2 24 [3 1 (1 3 ) (1 3 2 )]P am F a m m a m m m         (A5)
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where m = n-1, a = nj and F is the index of ethnic fractionalization as defined in equation
(1) before the elimination of group 1. The parameter a reflects the relative size of the
excluded group j (which is equal to the average of the others when a = n/(n+1)). Equation
(A5) is more likely to be positive when F is high, but it is also negatively related to the size
of the eliminated group (a). For a=1, equation (A5) reduces to
2 34 (3 2 2 )P m F m    . (A6)
This is always satisfied if F > ⅔, which is likely if n ≥ 3 and the largest group’s share is less 
than 50%. Thus, when regional shares are constructed by setting one group’s share to zero
and adding the remainder equally to all the other groups’ national shares, average local
polarization will exceed national polarization when F is high.
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Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics, Variables and Sources of Data
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Extent of Conflict 5,366 .4045844 .7947459 0 3
Group Population Share 6,752 0.116299 0.147400 0.0004 .87
Regional Concentration of Groups 6,845 .8701242 .3361913 0 1
GDP per Capita (lagged) – in log 5,962 8.157372 1.042435 5.139058 10.44478
National Population (lagged) – in log 5,954 9.849109 1.511517 5.667917 14.06172
Oil Dependency 6,273 .241033 .4277444 0 1
Anocracy (Lagged) 6,273 .1895425 .3919702 0 1
New Independent State 5,976 .0140562 .1177326 0 1
Political Instability 4,879 .1768805 .3816067 0 1
Diamond Mines 5,976 .2121821 .4088873 0 1
Group Concentration, Extent and Incidence of Conflict: Minority at Risk Dataset
Ethnic Fractionalization, Largest Ethnic Group, Second Largest Group, Mountainous
Terrain, the Ratio of Oil Export to Manufacturer Exports: Fearon and Laitin (2003).
Fearon and Laitin (2003) provide data on oil exports for the period 1945-1999. We use data
from the Energy International Administration to calculate the ratio of oil exports to
merchandise exports for the period 2000-2003.
GDP per Capita and Population: Penn World Table 6.2.
Alluvial diamonds: Lujala et al. (2005).
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Ethnic Polarization: Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a). The polarization data are not
available for all countries, so we impute the missing numbers using data on the share of the
second largest group provided by FL. The correlation between polarization and the share of
the second largest group is 0.77.
Regional Concentration and Rebellious Activity of Minority Groups: Minority at Risk
Project (MAR).
Democracy: Marshall M. G. and K. Jaggers (2002). We use a dummy which is equal one if
the Polity2 index is above zero in order to capture whether a country is democratic or not,
and the Polity2 index in order to control for the extent of democracy.
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